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ABSTRACT

My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by
pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical
naturalists must either (a) build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures
(or varying moral belief systems) into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties,
and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible
worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—
this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was
never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to
suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But,
according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral
knowledge.
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1
CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION
Referring to the realism/anti-realism debate in metaethics, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
writes, “The problem has always been to make sense of these [moral] convictions in a way
that does justice to morality’s apparent importance without engaging in metaphysical flights
of fancy.”1 It is a debate that came into sharp focus at the beginning of the 20th century with
G. E. Moore’s famous attack upon naturalistic accounts of moral concepts and defense of
ethical non-naturalism.2 According to Moore, theories that try to reconcile morality with
naturalism by using natural phenomena to define moral terms are guilty of “the naturalistic
fallacy,” which is evidenced by the fact that, whatever natural phenomena these theories pick
out as constituting goodness, it remains an open question whether or not those phenomena
are themselves good.
The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with regard to
the correct analysis of a given whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect by
consideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, with
significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good.3

And so, on Moore’s account, moral concepts are simple (i.e., have no parts; unexplainable
“by any manner of means . . . to anyone who does not already know it”4) and indefinable.
But, he admits, so are natural properties like being yellow, so why suppose that moral
properties are not only unanalyzable but non-natural as well? Moore’s answer involves a
further distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate properties. According to Moore, the
difference between goodness and simple natural properties like being yellow is that
[g]ood is the only one of these properties whose nature is not at all implicated in other
properties. Because higher- and lower-order natural properties differ in their degree of
mutual dependency [i.e., dependency upon each other for their explanations], they differ in
their degree of ultimacy, with none of them being ultimate. Good, though, is ultimate.5

1

Sayre-McCord 1988b: 2.
Moore 1988.
3
Moore 1988: §13, 15.
4
Moore 1988: §7, 7.
5
Hutchinson 2001: 23.
2
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And so moral properties are not only unanalyzable, but non-natural as well.6
Also, though he did not actually use the term, Moore is usually credited as the first to
suppose that moral properties supervene upon natural properties. In his account of intrinsic
value, for instance, Moore explains,
[I]f a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must
the same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything
exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree.7

According to Moore, propositions describing such a relation between the moral and nonmoral are not only synthetic necessary truths, but also, “the synthetic necessary connections
they express are metaphysically rock bottom, and thus are not explainable by any other
facts.”8 All of this, Moore insists, will be obvious to anyone who “will attentively consider
with himself what is actually before his mind” when reflecting upon moral concepts, i.e., at
least some moral truths are both synthetic and knowable a priori.
Moore’s powerful statement of a non-naturalistic moral realism would soon be
rejected by logical positivists like A. J. Ayer. Ayer begins his “Critique of Ethics and
Theology” by acknowledging a popular interest among philosophers in “the possibility of
reducing the whole sphere of ethical terms to non-ethical terms. We are enquiring whether
statements of ethical value can be translated into statements of empirical fact.”9 After
considering two contenders for such a task—utilitarian and subjectivist analyses of moral
concepts—Ayer finds them both wanting, for a reason not unlike Moore’s reason for
rejecting such theories:
6

There is an interesting body of literature concerning itself with Moore’s meaning of “natural,” and
so, what it would mean on Moore’s account for moral properties to be non-natural (see, for instance, Moore’s
reply to C. D. Broad in Schlipp 1968: 581-592; Hutchinson 2001: 39-60; Copp 2003: 180-181; and Dreier
2006). This matter is ultimately unimportant to the success of this thesis, and so I will refrain from pursuing it
entirely.
7 Moore 1922a: 261.
8 Horgan 1993: 560.
9 Ayer 1952: 104.
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We cannot agree that to call an action right is to say that of all the actions possible in the
circumstances it would cause, or be likely to cause, the greatest happiness, or the greatest
balance of pleasure over pain, or the greatest balance of satisfied over unsatisfied desire,
because we find that it is not self-contradictory to say that it is sometimes wrong to perform
the action which would actually or probably cause the greatest happiness, or the greatest
balance of pleasure over pain, or of satisfied over unsatisfied desire. And since it is not selfcontradictory to say that some pleasant things are not good, or that some bad things are
desired, it cannot be the case that the sentence “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasant” or
“x is desired.” And to every other variant of utilitiarianism with which I am acquainted the
same objection can be made.10

So on the unanalyzability of moral concepts, Moore and the positivists agree; but while
Moore explained this in terms of the simplicity of moral concepts, Ayer argues, “[T]he
reason why they are unanalysable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. The presence of an
ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.”11 Moral judgments,
Ayer is saying, are not truth-responsive to moral facts, but rather are expressions of some
empirical fact attended by an emotion of some sort. This, he explains, is because the moral
content of such expressions is not empirically verifiable, and so not cognitively significant.
For instance, if I were to say, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” Ayer explains, it
would be “as if I had said, ‘You stole that money,’ in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it
with some special exclamation marks.”12 And so, the positivists rejected any cognitivist
interpretations of moral judgments, an essential feature of moral realism.13
J. L. Mackie, on the other hand, granted Moore’s cognitivist interpretation of moral
judgments, attacking moral realism on the grounds that such judgments are never actually
true. Mackie’s two-part argument begins with an observation of “the well-known variation
in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the
differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex

Ayer 1952: 104-105.
Ayer 1952: 107.
12 Ayer 1952: 107.
13
I explain what is “essential” to moral realism in section 1.1 below.
10
11
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community.”14 Admitting that it does not follow from this fact that there are no actual moral
facts to which moral judgments are truth-responsive, Mackie’s point is just that
the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they
reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them
seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values.15

The second part of Mackie’s argument has two parts of its own—one metaphysical, the
other epistemological. On the one hand, if moral properties exist as realists like Moore
conceive them, then they are metaphysically “queer” sorts of things—things that are both (a)
real, perceivable features of the world and (b) intrinsically motivating.
An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of
any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this
end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there
were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would
have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it.16

Furthermore, Mackie insists, in order to explain our familiarity with these non-natural
entities (i.e., moral properties) and the relations they bear to the natural world, the Moorean
realist must appeal to some “queer” sort of epistemological faculty: “‘[A] special sort of
intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clear-headed objectivist is
compelled to resort.”17
So, as of just a few decades ago, moral realism was considered to be a rather taboo
position in metaethics.

The logical positivists exposed the incompatibility of moral

judgments and the standards of empirical verification, while error theorists like Mackie urged
that the things we know about the world and human nature are more readily explained by
the denial of queer moral entities and faculties of moral perception.

Mackie 1990: 36.
Mackie 1990: 37; emphasis mine.
16 Mackie 1990: 40.
17 Mackie 1990: 39.
14
15

Sayre-McCord
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summarizes the prevailing sentiment regarding moral realism throughout much of the 20th
century thus:
[E]ver since Moore offered the Open Question Argument against (definitional) naturalism,
philosophers have by and large assumed that moral realism faced insurmountable ontological
and epistemological difficulties. Indeed, the common . . . assumption is that the only realist
positions available in ethics are those that embrace supernatural properties and special
powers of moral intuition.18

In recent decades, however, these assumptions have been challenged by a number of
philosophers interested in developing an account of moral realism squarely within the
context of a thoroughgoing naturalism.19
In this thesis, I will suggest reasons for thinking that these recent attempts to
reconcile moral realism to naturalism have been unsuccessful, for the two are incompatible.
In Chapter 2, I will explain how moral properties are most commonly believed to fit into a
naturalistic ontology. This will involve a brief discussion of supervenience and the varieties
thereof, with particular attention given to the difference between weak and strong conceptions
of supervenience. Then I will go on to explain why I think that moral supervenience is
problematic for naturalism.

Since most (if not all) naturalistic conceptions of moral

supervenience describe moral properties as strongly supervening upon the natural world, I will
begin by raising a Darwinian dilemma for strong moral supervenience that will push the
ethical naturalist into one of two directions: he must either (a) build unique facts and
properties about particular social structures (or varying moral belief systems, etc.) into his
subvenient sets, and by doing so, jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths that is essential to
moral realism, or (b) insist, in the face of all possible worlds (or even different cultures of the
actual world) in which people have different moral beliefs than his, that those people are all
mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for his moral
18
19

Sayre-McCord 1988b: 13.
See, for instance, Railton 1986; Boyd 1988; Sturgeon 1988; Brink 1989; and Sayre-McCord1997.
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beliefs was never actually concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. The
naturalist still wishing to uphold moral realism will be left wondering whether or not the
epistemic freedoms of weak moral supervenience might offer a way out of this dilemma.
In Chapter 3, I will raise a justification problem for weak moral supervenience. The
implication will be that, if moral properties only weakly supervene on the natural world, then
we are never justified in making moral judgments (and so, it will turn out, weak
supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge). Then I will consider the prospects of
some naturalistic version of moral reliabilism as the only means of justifying moral beliefs
about weakly supervenient moral facts. My conclusion, however, will be that the prospects
are bleak, especially considering the Darwinian problems pointed out in Chapter 2.
In the end, it will look as if neither a strong nor a weak conception of moral
supervenience jibes with naturalism. So to conclude, I will suggest that ethical naturalists
ought to loosen their grip on something—i.e., they must either accept some version of ethical
non-naturalism or be an anti-realist about moral properties. But before I begin, I think it will
prove important to make as clear as possible what I will mean when I use the terms “moral
realism,” “naturalism,” and “ethical naturalism.”

1.1 What “moral realism” is
Moral realism is generally understood to involve the following two claims: (1) all
moral propositions are truth-apt (i.e., they are truth-responsive to the distribution of real
moral properties), and (2) at least some moral propositions are true. These two features of
moral realism can be seen as in direct conflict with the responses of Ayer and Mackie to
Moore described above: (1) is the affirmation of a cognitivist interpretation of moral
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judgments, contra Ayer’s expressivism; (2) is the denial of Mackie’s error theory. But more
is needed.
Surely, in order to warrant talk of genuine realism, we must understand the
instantiation of moral properties (i.e., the content of moral facts) to be a phenomenon
entirely independent of the beliefs of any person, group of persons, society, culture, etc.
And so some have suggested,20 and I agree, that moral realism must also be understood as
involving something like the following claim: (3) moral facts obtain independently of the
thoughts, attitudes, or beliefs of any person, and of the norms, beliefs, or practices of any
society or culture. As William Fitzpatrick explains, this is to be understood “in the sense
that when it comes to ethics, believing does not make it so, desiring or approving of
something does not make it good or right, and so on.”21 This third condition (which I will
call the independence condition) appropriately excludes most, if not all, versions of moral
subjectivism and relativism. Fitzpatrick, again, explains:
Ethical reality purchased too cheaply, with ethical truths reduced to truths about what we
approve of or practice, for example, would be of too little significance to make for
interesting and useful contrasts with non-realist views as such.22

Also excluded is any version of constructivism; although accounts like Korsgaard’s
do combine cognitivism with a rejection of error theory, constructivism and realism construe
moral truths in fundamentally different ways. For the realist, moral truths are things to be
discovered, and whatever procedures there are for answering questions in ethics are only
correct to the extent that they are responsive to those moral truths. By contrast, the
constructivist begins with some procedure that is deemed practically necessary, and so

20

See, for instance, Brink 2001: 154; Shafer-Landau 2003: 15; and Fitzpatrick 2006: 2ff. ShaferLandau expresses this condition in the following way: “[T]here are moral truths that obtain independently of
any preferred perspective, in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their
ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (2003: 15).
21
Fitzpatrick 2006: 2-3.
22
Fitzpatrick 2006: 3.
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answers to questions in ethics are correct in the constructed sense that they are the result of
the given procedure.

1.2 What “naturalism” is
I wish there were more of an agreement among philosophers about how, exactly,
naturalism ought to be conceived; but alas, the conceptions are many. Michael Rea, a nonnaturalist, insists that naturalism is not properly characterized as a philosophical thesis at all,
but rather as a research program, where “research program” is described as “a set of
methodological dispositions—dispositions to trust particular cognitive faculties as sources of
evidence and to treat particular kinds of experiences and arguments as evidence.”23
Others—naturalists especially—agree, contra Rea, that naturalism is much more than a mere
research program; it is a rather important and substantive philosophical view. But still, they
disagree about what the substance of that view actually is.
Some seem to regard naturalism as primarily a metaphysical thesis, a view about what
there is.24 Metaphysical naturalism is roughly the idea that the natural world is all there is,
where “natural world” is generally understood to denote something like the causal order of
things, or the “spatio-temporal manifold,” as David Armstrong put it.25 Although there is
further disagreement among naturalists as to where, exactly, the boundaries of “the natural
world” are to be drawn, all seem to agree in their denial of paradigmatically non-natural
things like souls, angels, God, and the like. There may be a relationship between this
metaphysical thesis and Rea’s conception of naturalism as a research program—Rea might
suggest that naturalists’ denial of, say, a non-natural God is just the result of them only

23

Rea unpublished MS: 3.
See, for instance, Danto 1967: 448 and Armstrong 1980: 35.
25
Armstrong 1989: 76,99.
24
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“treat[ing] particular kinds of experiences and arguments as evidence.” But there is an
important difference between the two: a research program isn’t in itself the assertion of
anything positive, while the thesis of metaphysical naturalism—“The natural world is all
there is”—clearly is. In this sense, metaphysical naturalism strikes me as going beyond a mere
research program.
Others see naturalism as more of an epistemological thesis, a view about what we can
know and how we can know it.26 According to David Copp, “A property is natural if and only if
any synthetic proposition about its instantiation that can be known, could only be known
empirically,”27 where “empirical” knowledge is contrasted with its traditional counterpart, a
priori knowledge.

Epistemological naturalism, then, is the thesis that all the synthetic

propositions that can be known can only be known empirically. “Ruled out,” Rea observes,
are evidential appeals to ungrounded hunches, rational intuitions (conscious episodes in
which a proposition seems to be necessarily true), putative divine revelation or religious
experiences, manifestly unreliable sources of testimony, and the like.28

This is why naturalists are so uncomfortable with intuitionism. Indeed, the very idea of
moral intuitions and their apparent incompatibility with a thoroughgoing naturalism seems
to have played a role in driving Ayer and Mackie (and many others) away from moral realism
in the first place. (And, as we’ll see, contemporary naturalistic defenses of moral realism
construe moral properties as natural things, presumably so that moral propositions can be
known empirically.)
There are still other expressions of what the fundamental thesis of naturalism is.
Some think that naturalism, at bottom, is a methodological thesis, a view about how philosophical

26

See, for instance, Quine 1995: 257; Devitt 1998: 45; and Copp 2003.
Copp 2003: 185.
28
Rea unpublished MS: 6-7. The difference between epistemological naturalism and Rea’s idea of
naturalism as a research program is less clear than it was in the case of metaphysical naturalism.
27
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inquiry ought to be carried out.29 Methodological naturalism is the idea that philosophy ought to
be done in a way that is continuous with the methods of the natural sciences. But it is hard
to see how this is significantly different than Rea’s idea of naturalism as a research program.
Others have added that naturalism ought to be, in some sense, reductive. According
to a reductive conception of the natural, there exists a base class of entities that is supposed
to be uncontroversially natural, and so for any other entity to be properly considered natural,
it must in some way be reducible to a member (or members) of the initial base class. The
major difficulty with such an approach is quite simply that many naturalists do not see a
need to so constrain our conception of the natural in the first place. It seems perfectly fine,
for instance, to suppose that the property being a chair is both (a) irreducible to and (b) just as
natural as the physically fundamental things of which the chair is composed. And so there
doesn’t seem to be any reason to suppose that non-reductive naturalists are any less
naturalistic than those engaged in such a project of reduction.30
For my purposes, a thoroughgoing naturalist is someone who affirms both
metaphysical and epistemological naturalism,31 with a mind to ultimately follow the sciences
wherever the sciences might lead. So whenever I refer to “naturalism” or “naturalists,” this
is what I will have in mind. With Rea, I take it that most naturalists would affirm Wilfrid
Sellars’ slogan that “science is the measure of all things: of what is that it is and of what is
29

See, for instance, Leiter 1998: 81.
Wedgewood (1997) argues that naturalism in ethics just is the reduction of the moral to the natural,
and so the only options are (a) reductive naturalism or (b) non-naturalism.
31
Interestingly, Rea (unpublished MS: 5) argues that naturalism as a methodology actually ought to
keep people from being either metaphysical or epistemological naturalists. His suggestion is that it is, in
principle, possible for the sciences to produce evidence that either the metaphysical or epistemological thesis
(or both) is wrong. But, he goes on, since no naturalist would think naturalism itself had been refuted were such
evidence to be produced, naturalism must be something different than either of these theses. I don’t think he’s
right about this. If the sciences somehow produced compelling-enough evidence for the existence of some
non-natural thing (e.g., God) or some non-natural means of knowledge acquisition (e.g., intuitions), my hunch
is that any respectable naturalist would just cease being a naturalist. (Indeed, a number of philosophers are coming
to embrace various forms of non-naturalism for just these sorts of reasons.) And if I am wrong, I’d suggest
that the problem has more to do with the psychology of the unwieldy naturalist than with how naturalism is
being conceived.
30
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not that it is not.”32 Indeed, this seems to be the very heart of what lies behind all of the
various conceptions of naturalism.

1.3 What “ethical naturalism” is
The aim of my thesis is to challenge the adequacy of what many refer to as “ethical
naturalism.” Ethical naturalism can mean one of two things. Broadly, ethical naturalism
refers to any attempt to reconcile morality to naturalism.

In this sense, not only are

contemporary moral realists like David Brink and Nicholas Sturgeon ethical naturalists, but
so are expressivists like Ayer and error theorists like Mackie. Ayer’s attempt to reconcile
morality to naturalism, for instance, led him to be an anti-realist about moral properties.
More narrowly, however, ethical naturalism refers to the conjunction of naturalism and
moral realism.

It is to this narrower (and more common) understanding of ethical

naturalism that I will be referring in what follows.

32

Sellars 1963: 173.
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CHAPTER TWO: DARWINISM AND STRONG MORAL SUPERVENIENCE
As I pointed out in my introduction, the realism/anti-realism debate in ethics is
largely a matter of preserving the importance of morality, on the one hand, without engaging
in what Sayre-McCord has called “metaphysical flights of fancy,” on the other. And sure
enough, one of the primary reasons that so many have rejected moral realism, especially in
the last hundred-or-so years, has been that they find it too metaphysically fanciful. Starting
in the 1980’s, however, a number of moral philosophers began to take great strides toward
de-mystifying moral realism, explaining how a realm of moral facts and properties can
comfortably fit into a strictly naturalistic ontology.
The key for these philosophers has been to explain how it is that moral facts and
properties can be conceived of as exhaustively constituted by natural facts and properties.
David Brink, for instance, writes,
The ethical naturalist’s appeal to the constitution of moral facts by natural facts is not
metaphysically queer. This relation of constitution, composition, or realization is quite
familiar. Tables are constituted by certain arrangements of microphysical particles; biological
processes such as photosynthesis are constituted by physical and chemical events causally
related in certain ways; psychological states are constituted by certain arrangements of brain
states; and large scale social events such as wars and elections are constituted by enormously
complex sets of smaller scale social and political events causally and temporally related in
certain ways.33

Another way of wording this relation of constitution is to say that moral properties supervene
upon base sets of natural facts and properties, an idea that, ironically enough, seems to have
originated with Moore.34

But unlike Moore, naturalists like Brink take it that moral

properties are made up exclusively of the natural things upon which they supervene, making

33
34

Brink 1989: 177.
See ch. 1, n. 6.
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them no less natural than, say, photosynthesis; and so there is simply no reason for queerness
worries.35
In this chapter, I wish to explore the idea of the supervenience of the moral realm
upon the natural world. In particular, my aim will be to raise worries about the compatibility
of moral supervenience with other traditional commitments of naturalism—namely,
Darwinism. After spending some time explaining the difference between weak and strong
conceptions of supervenience, and why ethical naturalists generally prefer the latter of the
two, I will then attempt to show that strong moral supervenience and Darwinian naturalism
are incompatible.

2.1 Weak and strong supervenience
In his “Concepts of Supervenience,” Jaegwon Kim considers two sets of properties,
set A and set B. Set A contains only the property being a good man, while set B contains the
properties being courageous, being benevolent, and being honest. To say that A weakly supervenes on
B is to say that if any two men in some possible world have exactly the same B-properties in
common (say they are both courageous and benevolent but not honest), then the two must
either both be good men or neither is. So weak supervenience is the claim:
Necessarily, for any x and any y in world α, if x is A and x is B and A supervenes upon B in
α, then if y is B, y will also be A.

35

There is an interesting debate had by metaphysicians about whether or not the supervenience of
some property A upon some set of facts and properties B commits one to the idea that A is something
metaphysically distinct from B, something “over and above” B. When considering, for instance, a metaphysical
entity composed of a trout and a turkey, David Lewis writes, “[I]t is neither fish nor fowl, but it is nothing else:
it is part fish and part fowl” (Lewis 1991: 80). So the fusion of trout and turkey is metaphysically “nothing over
and above” either the trout or the turkey. Others wonder whether or not this makes any sense: “[W]hat does
‘nothing over and above’ mean? This slippery phrase has had a lot of employment in philosophy, but what it
means is never explained by its employers” (van Inwagen 1994: 210). Although the debate is both interesting
and relevant (Does it ultimately make sense to say that moral properties, while constituted exhaustively by
natural things, are “nothing over and above” the things that constitute them?), I will avoid it entirely and
assume for the time being that the ethical naturalist’s construal of moral supervenience is “ontologically
innocent” enough. For more, see van Inwagen 1990, Merricks 2001, and Dorr and Rosen 2002.
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Importantly, on weak supervenience, whether a thing bearing all of the subvening natural
properties has or does not have the supervening property as well will depend entirely upon
the particular world under consideration, and is not invariant across possible worlds. Weak
supervenience, then, allows for all of the following:
(a) In this world anyone who is courageous, benevolent, and honest is a good man, but in
another possible world no such man is good; in fact, every such man is evil in this other
world.
(b) Again, in this world anyone who has courage, benevolence, and honesty is good; in
another world exactly like this one in respect of the distribution of these virtues, no man
is good.
(c) In another possible world just like this one in respect of who has, or lacks, these traits
of character, every man is good.36

Strong supervenience, on the other hand, fixes the supervenience relation across all
possible worlds.

Consider again Kim’s two sets of properties.

According to strong

supervenience, if John is both courageous and honest, and his being a good man strongly
supervenes upon his being courageous and honest, then anyone in any possible world who is
also courageous and honest must also be good. And so strong supervenience is the claim:
Necessarily, for any x in world α and any y in world β, if x is A and x is B and A supervenes
upon B in α, then if y is B, y will also be A.

If moral properties strongly supervene on natural properties, then there cannot be two
naturally indiscernible worlds that are morally discernible because the relationship between
the natural world and the realm of moral facts and properties is a necessary one.
So when philosophers say that moral facts and properties supervene upon natural
facts and properties, to which sort of supervenience are they referring, weak or strong? R.
M. Hare once said that his claim that value properties supervene on other sorts of properties
was intended to be an appeal to weak supervenience.37 But among moral philosophers, Hare
is very much in the minority, for reasons often associated with the work of Simon
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Blackburn.38 According to Blackburn, philosophers who suppose that moral facts and
properties only weakly supervene upon natural facts and properties cannot explain why there
cannot possibly be two things in the same world that are indiscernible with respect to their
subvening natural properties but discernible with respect to their supervening moral
properties.39 For these and other reasons, ethical naturalists generally tend to favor a strong
conception of moral supervenience.40

2.2 Dependence and relevance
There are two more things that I’d like to point out about moral supervenience that
will prove important for the purposes of this thesis. First, moral supervenience can be
understood as a kind of dependence relation, according to which a thing has the moral property
that it has because it has the natural properties that it has.41 In other words, a thing’s moral
value will depend upon its natural characteristics. In this sense, borrowing Dancy’s term,42
moral properties are resultant properties: They are the metaphysical result of the coming
together of certain natural facts and properties.
Second, a distinction can be made between relevant and irrelevant properties when
enumerating the members of our subvenient sets.

If moral properties are resultant

properties that depend for their presence and content upon the natural features that subvene
under them, then subvenient sets will include only those things that are relevant to the
determination of supervening properties. Consider the act of rape. Presumably, some
38
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40
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natural, descriptive properties of that event subvene under the moral property being wrong,
while other properties of the event do not. The property being the cause of suffering, for
instance, probably plays a significant role in the instantiation of wrongness. But other
properties—like, say, taking place near a tree or taking place three weeks before Flag Day—while
certainly parts of a full description of the event, are not constitutive of moral wrongness.
This is what Blackburn has in mind with his “limitation thesis”:
This [limitation thesis] will say that whenever a property F supervenes upon some basis,
there is necessarily a boundary to the kind of G properties that it can depend upon. . . .
[T]he moral supervenes upon the natural, and the thesis will tell us that there are some
natural properties that necessarily have no relevance to moral ones—pure spatial position,
perhaps, or date of beginning in time.43

So when we are asked to name some, or all, of the things that subvene under a moral fact or
property, we are only concerned with those things that play a relevant, morally-determinant
role.

2.3 Darwinism and ethical naturalism
As per my description of naturalism in Chapter 1, I will assume for the sake of this
discussion that ethical naturalists want to uphold the possibility of a scientific explanation of
the world that we inhabit. Naturalism, I remarked, is understood by many as a kind of
project (or substantive philosophical thesis) according to which the world is explainable in
terms of the subject matter of the various scientific disciplines.44 The function of white
blood cells, the nature of human emotions, and the rituals of some remote Indonesian tribe
are not typically understood by naturalists to be best described in terms of, say, the
supernatural, but rather as the subject matter of the biological, psychological, and
anthropological sciences, respectively.
43
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A further assumption that I think it probably safe to make is this: the various full
accounts that naturalists will give for such things as white blood cells, for instance, will all
involve a harkening back to the evolutionary origins of those things. This is because, as
Sommers and Rosenberg observe, “Darwinian naturalism is the only game in town for
naturalists.”45 So if, as Daniel Dennett has argued, Darwinism is indeed a kind of “universal
acid” that eats through and informs our understanding of just about everything,46 then ethics
cannot be the sort of autonomous field of enquiry that others think it is.47 After all, as long
as naturalism is understood as the kind of far-reaching explanatory project that it is, how odd
it would be to appeal to evolution for explanations of the nature and origin of white blood
cells and the human emotions, for instance, but to then offer some other sort of account of
the nature and origin of human morality. Surely, for the ethical naturalist, the nearest
available account of the origin of our beliefs about morality, and the account that squares
most comfortably with his or her naturalism, is an evolutionary one. But, as I will now
explain, despite the fact that most ethical naturalists regard it a virtue of their theory that it
squares so nicely with the explanatory aims of the evolutionary sciences, the story that
evolution actually tells about the formation of our moral beliefs is one that seems, upon
inspection, to be incompatible with the implications and demands of strong moral
supervenience.

2.4 Evolution and the formation of our moral beliefs
So what does evolution have to say about our having the moral beliefs that we have?
On a Darwinian scheme, we have the moral beliefs that we have, to a significant degree at
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least, because of selective evolutionary pressures. We should expect there to have been
tremendous evolutionary pressure to hold, for instance, those moral beliefs that tend more
so than others to promote survival and reproductive success. But if evolutionary pressures
have played such a role in the formation of our moral beliefs, pushing us in the direction of
some rather than others, then what reason is there to suppose that we’ve arrived upon a
body of true moral beliefs? So the question for the ethical naturalist, raised recently by
Sharon Street,48 becomes this: Given these potentially distorting evolutionary pressures, what
sort of relationship is there between our having the moral beliefs that we have, on the one
hand, and the truth-makers of those beliefs (i.e., the actual distribution of moral properties),
on the other?
Street considers two competing accounts of this relationship—the tracking account and
the adaptive link account.49 According to the tracking account, although the content of our
moral beliefs has been largely determined by evolutionary pressures, “we may understand
these evolutionary causes as having tracked the truth.”50 Our having these moral beliefs is
explained by the fact that the beliefs themselves are true, “and that the capacity to discern
such truths proved advantageous for the purposes of survival and reproduction.”51 On the
other hand, according to the adaptive link account, having certain moral beliefs rather than
others contributed to the reproductive fitness of our ancestors not because the beliefs are
true, but simply
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because they forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances and their responses
to those circumstances, getting them to act, feel, and believe in ways that turned out to be
reproductively advantageous.52

So whereas on the tracking account, there is a dependence relationship between our having
the moral beliefs we have and the truth-makers of those beliefs—with the former depending
upon the latter for their presence and content—there is no such dependence according to
the adaptive link account.
Street presses her point further by suggesting that there are good reasons to think
that the adaptive link account is explanatorily superior to the tracking account. First of all,
while both may offer compelling stories about how we’ve come to have the moral beliefs
that we have, “the tracking account posits something extra that the adaptive link account
does not, namely independent evaluative truths.”53 The adaptive link account is therefore
the more parsimonious of the two. Second, the adaptive link account is in some sense
clearer than the tracking account, since it is not clear how having certain moral beliefs because
they are true would contribute to our survival and reproductive success any more so than
having the same moral beliefs for other, obviously helpful reasons (e.g., their tendency to
forge adaptive links necessary for survival). And finally, the adaptive link account does a
better job of explaining “why there are widespread tendencies among human beings to make
some evaluative judgments rather than others.”54 Not only does the tracking account fail to
explain the remarkable coincidence that so many moral truths turn out to be just the sorts of
things that forge the adaptive links that Street describes, but it also fails to explain our
natural tendency to hold some moral beliefs that are probably not true (e.g., the belief that
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“the fact that someone is in an ‘out-group’ of some kind is a reason to accord him or her
lesser treatment than those in the ‘in-group’”55).
What the ethical naturalist should find especially troubling about all of this is precisely
that, on the better of the two evolutionary explanations of our having the moral beliefs that
we have, the truth of those beliefs seems to play no part whatsoever in the formation of those
beliefs.56 According to Sommers and Rosenberg, the Darwinian account of the origins of
our moral beliefs makes it “apparent that the best explanation—blind variation and natural
selection—for the emergence of our ethical belief[s] does not require that these beliefs have
truth-makers.”57

In the next section, I will explain the implications that I think this

conclusion has upon the ethical naturalist’s claim of strong moral supervenience.

2.5 A Darwinian dilemma for strong moral supervenience: the first horn
Given the many contingencies of evolution, it seems reasonable to suppose that the
human social structures upon which most (or all) of our moral beliefs are to some extent
based could have been significantly different. Darwin himself imagined a possible world in
which human beings developed under social conditions not unlike those of hive-bees.58 In
such a world, it is reasonable to suppose that circumstances could obtain in which all of the
relevant natural properties are present, and upon which, in our world, we believe wrongness
supervenes, but nonetheless, in that world, people believe that some property other than
wrongness supervenes (or perhaps people believe that no moral property supervenes at all).
This much is possible even if moral properties strongly supervene on the natural world.
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Were we like hive-bees, for instance, we would believe our unmarried females to have some
duty to kill their brothers. And so, whereas we would (hopefully) believe my sister’s killing
me in the actual world to be wrong, there is a not-too-distant possible world (call it W) in
which our beliefs about the matter are quite different, despite all of the relevant natural
properties obtaining.
Call the set of relevant natural properties involved in my sister’s killing me in the
actual world K1, and we’re supposing that wrongness supervenes on K1. In W, however,
people are like hive-bees, and so a relevantly identical set of natural properties, K2, is believed
to yield, say, no moral property at all. Now, according to strong supervenience, to imagine a
circumstance different with respect to its supervening property must be to imagine it
different with respect to its subvening properties as well, no matter the possible world. So, if
it is the case that moral properties strongly supervene on natural properties, then the ethical
naturalist has two options with regard to this thought experiment: either (a) deny that K1 and
K2 are identical in every relevant respect, or (b) agree that the two circumstances really are
identical with respect to their moral properties, which would mean that one group of
people—those in the actual world or those in W—is actually quite mistaken in its moral
beliefs about siblicide (and, presumably, many other moral beliefs). But, as I will explain,
neither (a) nor (b) is in the end appealing.
Consider the first of the ethical naturalist’s two options and recall the distinction I
made above between relevant and irrelevant properties. The question is not, “How might
K1 and K2 be naturally discernible?” but rather, “How might K1 and K2 be relevantly naturally
discernible?” While some might answer that the fact that K2 occurred in a world where
people have evolved socially like hive-bees, having hive-bee sorts of beliefs and patterns of
behavior, etc., these sorts of considerations cannot be counted as relevant by moral realists.
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As I explained earlier, according to moral realism, moral facts cannot in any way depend
upon the beliefs of any person or norms of any society. And so such facts cannot play a
determinant role in the moral nature of any person, action, or state of affairs. In other
words, despite the fact that people in W believe very sincerely that my sister has some sort of
sacred duty to kill me, the independence condition of moral realism makes it such that
“believing does not make it so, desiring or approving of something does not make it good or
right, and so on.”
After all, if considerations about either the beliefs of persons or facts about
individual social structures are allowed to be relevant in our evaluation of K1 and K2, then I
see no reason to disallow these sorts of considerations to be relevant when comparing similar
circumstances occurring within different social structures in the same world. There are, of
course, cultures in the actual world that exhibit vastly different moral beliefs and practices.
In their book Unto Others, Elliot Sober and David Wilson mention a recent study that found
that 39 of 60 randomly selected societies practiced infanticide.59

So if we’re building

information about different social structures into our subvenient sets of relevant facts and
properties, then perhaps wrongness does not (in certain cultures) supervene upon the killing
of a female infant as long as the people doing so believe, say, that male offspring are of
greater value than females. And perhaps, due to allegedly relevant differences in social
structure or environment, the “ironing” of a young woman’s breasts in order to make her
less attractive to on-looking men, despite (presumably) subvening under wrongness here in
egalitarian America, does not subvene under wrongness in Cameroon (or in parts of
Cameroon, or for certain inhabitants of Cameroon).60 I could go on and on, but this is just
relativism—something any realist ought to avoid—and it has everything to do with allowing
59
60

Sober and Wilson 1998: 301-302.
Sa’ah 2006.

23
too much into our subvenient sets of relevant, morally-determinant natural facts and
properties. So the challenge for the ethical naturalist will be to suggest some relevant natural
difference between circumstances like K1 and K2 that does not, again borrowing Fitzpatrick’s
words, purchase ethical reality too cheaply, “with ethical truths reduced to truths about what
we approve of or practice.”

2.5.1 Defending the first horn
The reader might ask, “But what if, due to relevant differences of environment and
circumstance, the divergent moral beliefs or practices of a particular culture are justified?”
After all, it certainly seems possible for there to be naturalistically respectable reasons for
some culture to believe infanticide to be permissible (e.g., population pressures). So why not
suppose that whatever it is that justifies such beliefs or practices (e.g., infanticide’s survival
value) is itself a relevant natural difference between two cultures and the beliefs thereof?
My response is that while the naturalist is fully capable of providing very robust and
informative accounts of what is and is not necessary for a species’ (or culture’s, or person’s)
survival, we’ve got reason to think, via Street’s argument, that this is not only not the same thing
as the apprehension of moral facts, but also wholly unrelated to the obtaining of moral facts.
Street’s argument drives a kind of epistemic wedge between facts about survival value and
facts about moral right and wrong, and ethical naturalists seem to be just begging the
question against such an argument by assuming that the two sorts of facts are one and the
same, or that they’re even related. I take it that there is an important difference between
propositions like “Exercising is good if you want to prolong your life” or “Driving with your
eyes closed is bad if you want to prolong your life” and propositions like “Saving lives is
good” or “Taking lives is bad.” The first two propositions seem to be ascriptions of some non-
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moral value to an action, whereas the last two seem clearly to be moral propositions (I have in
mind something like the difference between instrumental and moral good). This distinction
bears an important relationship to Street’s distinction between the two accounts of our
moral beliefs, the truth-tracking account and the adaptive-link account. What is suggested
by the adaptive-link account is precisely that whenever we think we’ve got our hands on
moral truth, what we’ve really got our hands on is just an inherited belief about non-moral
survival value. So the question that the ethical naturalist will now have to answer is this:
Why suppose that the fact that some culture’s belief or practice is justified (a better word
might be demanded) by certain features of its circumstances is ever more than just a natural
difference, but rather a relevant, morally-determinant natural difference? And the naturalist’s
answer will have to be something more interesting than merely defining moral concepts in
terms of that which is needed for survival. Not only would such a response run the risk of
conflating instrumental and moral good, but it would also have to provide a principle (or
system of principles) for weighing certain instrumental goods against each other whenever
conflict between two or more arises, and this would seem to invoke a concept of normativity
that goes beyond the reach of naturalism.61

2.6 The second horn of the dilemma
What about the ethical naturalist’s second way out of the dilemma? Here she must
insist that that someone is mistaken. If wrongness does supervene on K1, then it supervenes
on K2 as well, and people in W are just wrong to believe otherwise. On the other hand, if
people in W are right, and wrongness does not supervene on K2, then it is those of us in the
actual world that are mistaken in thinking that K1 is wrong. After all, “wrongness” is either
61
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constituted by that set of relevant natural properties or it is not; just like “water” either
consists in H2O or it does not. So for those of us in the actual world to say of K-actions
that they are wrong, we must then be implying that people in W are mistaken in their moral
judgments. But, first of all, by implying that people in W are so mistaken, aren’t we thereby
guilty of what Judith Jarvis Thompson has called “metaphysical imperialism,” where we
wrongly just assume that the meaning of normative terms is inextricably tied to our interests,
our language, and/or our social structure?62 And second, where do we get off doing such a
thing if, on an evolutionary scheme, we’ve got no compelling reason to think that the
mechanism responsible for our moral beliefs was ever truth-aimed in the first place? It
certainly seems as if a Darwinian account of the formation of our moral beliefs might here
serve as a kind of defeater to any claims of moral authority that people in the actual world
(or any world with a similar Darwinian story to tell) might be able to muster.

2.6.1 Defending the second horn
In response to this suggestion that Darwinian considerations give us reason for
moral skepticism, and so remove any grounds of moral authority upon which we might
judge the moral beliefs of others to be right or wrong, the ethical naturalist might ask if the
trustworthiness of our moral beliefs might be redeemed by an appeal to our capacity for
rational reflection. Surely, the objector might suggest, we are able to reflect on the moral
beliefs that we have and critically evaluate them in a way that might “latch onto” moral truth.
62
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Here is Street’s response to this sort of objection:
[W]hat rational reflection about evaluative matters involves, inescapably, is assessing some
evaluative judgments in terms of others. . . . The widespread consensus that the method of
reflective equilibrium, broadly understood, is our sole means of proceeding in ethics is an
acknowledgement of this fact: ultimately, we can test our evaluative judgments only by
testing their consistency with our other evaluative judgments, combined of course with
judgments about the (non-evaluative) facts. Thus, if the fund of evaluative judgments with
which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with illegitimate influence [i.e.,
evolutionary pressures unconcerned with truth] . . . then the tools of rational reflection were
equally contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former. It follows that all
our reflection over the ages has really just been a process of assessing evaluative judgments
that are mostly off the mark in terms of others that are mostly off the mark.63

Another way of putting Street’s point is to ask: Why suppose that the processes of critical
reflection to which the objector refers are ever reliable when it comes to getting our hands
on moral truths? Epistemic reliability has everything to do with a mechanism’s (or process’s)
having produced more true beliefs than false beliefs. But if the evolutionary considerations
I’ve described above are enough for even a temporary skepticism of the truth-responsiveness
of our moral beliefs, then upon what grounds might we be able to make any claims
whatsoever about reliability?64 In other words, some critically reflective process might very
well land us upon some moral truth of the matter, but (a) we’d never know that it had, and so
(b) we’d have no basis for making claims about what sort of process is genuinely reliable and
what processes aren’t.

2.7 Conclusion
Ethical naturalists may now have reason to worry that strong moral supervenience
does not square as comfortably with other commitments of theirs (i.e., Darwinism) as they
had once thought. So inasmuch as they are interested in upholding ethical naturalism, they
might wonder if weakening the supervenience claim might offer them a solution to my
dilemma. After all, if the moral realm only weakly supervenes upon natural facts and
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properties, then there is no problem at all with K1 and K2 subvening under different moral
properties, and so the above dilemma is easily answerable. Unfortunately, as I will argue in
Chapter 3, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge, and so not the sort of
problem-solver that an ethical naturalist might hope.
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CHAPTER THREE: WEAK MORAL SUPERVENIENCE AND JUSTIFICATION
As I explained earlier, on weak supervenience, there is a possible world identical to
ours in every natural respect, but different in terms of its configuration of moral properties
across those natural phenomena. In fact, if moral properties only weakly supervene on
natural properties, then there is a possible world that is identical to ours in every natural
respect but contains no moral properties at all. Call this world W*.
In W*, as opposed to W in Chapter 2, evolutionary processes have taken precisely the
same course that they have in our world, resulting in precisely the same cultural phenomena,
social norms and practices, and other sorts of natural facts, whether significant to my
discussion or not. So in W*, a man exactly like the Adolf Hitler of the actual world in every
natural respect led exactly the same life, in every natural respect. Call him Schmadolf
Hitler.65 However, the sort of moral character that we typically ascribe to the Hitler of our
world (e.g., morally depraved), and the sorts of moral properties we believe his actions to
have had (e.g., evil), are not actually a part of the ontology of W*. So in W*, Schmadolf
Hitler is also causally responsible for the termination of millions of people, and when people
in W* reflect upon his actions, they experience the same sort of emotional uneasiness that
people in our world experience when they reflect upon the events of the Holocaust. But
when we say that the Holocaust was evil, or that Hitler was depraved, those terms actually have
metaphysical referents in our world (i.e., moral properties), whereas such words bear no
genuine connection to reality in W*, for there are no such properties in that world. The
questions I want to explore in this chapter are these: Are we justified in supposing there to
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be any real difference between W* and the actual world? And if not, then in what sense are
we justified in believing there to be moral properties in the actual world?
As we’ve already established, W* is a world identical to ours in every natural respect,
differing only in the sense that there are no moral properties in W*. But if the two worlds are
naturally indiscernible, then so must whatever faculties are responsible for our belief in the
existence of supervening moral properties in our world be shared by people in W*. So
inhabitants of W* have precisely the same cognitive faculties performing precisely the same
relevant functions, arriving at precisely the same moral beliefs. Their neuropsychological
makeup is no different than ours. As I mentioned earlier, people in W* have the same
psychological response to events in their world as we do to events in ours—e.g., repulsion at
the thought of an event like the Holocaust, leading them to regard it as evil. If, however, a
person in W* were to say of some action that it is wrong, or of some state of affairs that it is
evil, she would only be fooling herself because there is no such thing in W*. But if this is
allowed, then upon what grounds could we possibly claim to know that our world actually
does have these supervening moral properties while W* does not? If inhabitants of W* can
have precisely the same sorts and patterns of (what might be called) “moral” experiences as
we do and still be mistaken about the reality of moral properties, then so could we. It would
seem, then, until we are able to distinguish the actual world from W*, there is some reason
to doubt that our moral propositions are ever true, for it might be the case, like it is for those
in W*, that our moral terms actually refer to nothing. And so, perhaps some variety of
moral skepticism might be more appropriate, that is, if we assume that moral properties only
weakly supervene on natural properties.
At this point, I suspect someone will wonder, “How is this problem (for weak moral
supervenience) any more threatening to the security of our moral knowledge than brain-in-a-
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vat/Cartesian deceiver stories are to the security of our knowledge in general?” As long as
moral properties do supervene on natural properties in the actual world, and as long as we’ve
got some positive reason to suppose that moral properties supervene on natural properties in
the actual world (e.g., perhaps because they figure into our best explanations of various
phenomena), then why suppose that we’ve got to know that moral properties supervene on
natural properties in the actual world in order to have moral knowledge—that is, why
suppose that we have to know that we know? In what follows, I will argue that, given weak
supervenience, naturalists do not have positive reason to suppose that moral properties
supervene on natural phenomena in the actual world. So if my argument is sound, it will
present those ethical naturalists settling for the freedoms of weak supervenience with a
defeater for moral knowledge.

3.1 Weak supervenience and the justification of moral beliefs
In his article “Moral Explanations,” Nicholas Sturgeon makes a case for the
explanatory potency of moral properties. In doing so, Sturgeon recalls Bernard DeVoto’s
The Year of Decision: 1846, which tells the story of a group of American emigrants already in
California and their efforts “to rescue another party of emigrants, the Donner Party, trapped
by snows in the High Sierras.”66 The rescue efforts, however, were lead by a certain Selim
Woodworth, who “not only failed to lead rescue parties into the mountains himself, . . . but
had to be ‘shamed, threatened, and bullied’ even into organizing the efforts of others willing
to take the risk.”67 In his free time, Woodworth was sure to arrange for his own comforts in
camp, ironically touting the importance of his position. And, of course, many innocent
emigrants died who might have been spared, “including four known still to be alive when he
66
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[Woodworth] turned back for the last time in mid-March.”68 Thus, DeVoto concludes,
“Woodworth was just no damned good.”69
Getting back to his case for the explanatory value of moral facts and properties,
Sturgeon urges, “If DeVoto is right about this evidence, . . . it seems reasonable that part of
the explanation of his believing that Woodworth was no damned good is just that
Woodworth was no damned good.”70 If moral facts (e.g., Woodworth’s being no damned good)
are explanatorily irrelevant to the circumstances in which they are believed to obtain, a
suggestion made by Gilbert Harman,71 then it seems to Sturgeon reasonable to suppose not
only that the circumstances would have occurred in just the same way, but also that we could
just as easily (and accurately) explain those circumstances, even if the moral facts had been
otherwise.
For it is natural to think that if a particular assumption is completely irrelevant to the
explanation of a certain fact, then the fact would have obtained, and we could have
explained it just as well, even if the assumption had been false.72

But in what reasonable way might the above story be told, preserving all of its non-moral
characteristics, if Woodworth had been, say, so damned good? Does it seem reasonable to
suppose that Woodworth would have done the things he did if he had been so damned good?
Presumably not. Woodworth did the things he did, at least in part, because of his despicable
moral character. So it would seem that, in some sense, the moral realm has a determinant
causal power over the natural facts of human activity.
But surely this does not square well with the allowances of weak supervenience.
After all, as difficult as it might be for us to imagine Selim Woodworth or, say, Adolf Hitler
having done the things they did without also having had the sort of depraved moral
68
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characters that we believe they had, it is, by definition, possible given weak supervenience—
witness Schmadolf Hitler. And further, if people in W* have precisely the same sorts of
beliefs about Schmadolf as we have about Adolf, then in what sense can we really insist that
Adolf’s actual moral depravity played some role in the formation of our belief that he was
morally depraved? After all, any account we give is only going to be echoed by people in
W*, but, according to our thought experiment, they’d be exactly wrong. So on weak
supervenience, not only do we have no way of knowing whether or not moral properties
really do supervene on natural properties in the actual world (i.e., whether or not the actual
world and W* are morally discernible), but we may also lack justification for our moral beliefs,
since any justificatory accounts of ours could be (mistakenly) echoed by people in W*. And
so weak moral supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge.
To be clear, the suggestion I am making is this: If the only difference between W*
and the actual world is that the actual world contains moral properties and W* does not, and
there is no justified way to distinguish the actual world from W*, then we cannot
justifiably believe that there are moral properties in the actual world. Consider a similar case.
After a game of basketball with a few friends, I walk into the locker room to grab my gym
bag before leaving. At the same time, a friend of mine returns to the locker to grab his gym
bag. While we were playing, a janitor tossed all of our bags into the same corner of the
locker room, and so they are not in the places we remember leaving them. Suppose my
friend and I have qualitatively identical bags, filled with qualitatively identical items. The
only difference between the two bags is that one belongs to me and the other belongs to
him, but there is no way for either of us to distinguish between the two. In such a case, I
hardly seem justified grabbing one and believing that it is mine. So the same principle that I
am suggesting applies to W* and the actual world seems to apply just as well to the two
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identical gym bags: If the only difference between two gym bags is that one belongs to me
and the other belongs to my friend, and there is no justified way to distinguish one bag from
the other, then I cannot justifiably grab one and believe that it is mine.
Notice that it will not help at all to point to any particular feature of one of the
bags—say, for instance, to point to a small tear near one of the ends of the zipper—because
the two bags are identical. In response to any such suggestion, my friend will only have to
say, "But that bag has the same-sized tear in the same place." And so the fact that the bag
I'm holding has a small tear near one of the ends of the zipper cannot count as a justifying
reason for believing that "This bag is mine," since there will be a counter-weighing defeater
immediately available for every such reason. Similarly, when trying to distinguish between
the actual world and W*, it will not help to point to any of the features of the actual world
that are traditionally taken to be justifying reasons for moral beliefs (e.g., the near universal
disapproval of Hitler’s bahavior), since there will be a counter-weighing defeater immediately
available in W* for every such reason.

3.2 Alternative hypotheses arguments
In his “Moral Skepticism and Justification,” Walter Sinnott-Armstrong develops two
skeptical arguments against the justification of moral beliefs.73 According to one, which I
will call the alternative hypotheses argument, no person is ever justified in holding any moral
belief unless he or she is able to rule out alternative hypotheses. And so, as it turns out, no
person is ever justified in holding any moral belief since no person can ever rule out the
possibility that moral nihilism is true (without begging the question, that is). The argument
that I am making here very closely resembles an alternative hypotheses argument. I am
73
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saying that naturalists cannot be justified in believing the actual world to contain moral
properties unless they can rule out the alternative hypothesis that W* and the actual world
are identical.

And since, as I’m arguing, naturalists cannot rule out this alternative

hypothesis, they are not justified in believing the actual world to contain moral properties
(and, consequently, they are not justified in any particular moral belief about the actual world).
There are generally two ways of responding to alternative hypotheses arguments.
According to the first, one tries to distinguish between likely and unlikely alternative
hypotheses and adds that only likely alternative hypotheses are genuinely threatening. To
borrow one of Sinnott-Armstrong’s examples, imagine Hannah is trying to figure what is
inside a wrapped birthday present. The present is shaped like a small flat box and its
contents rattle when she shakes it. Since it’s unlikely that the present contains either a bike
(because the box is too small) or clothing (because clothing doesn’t often rattle when
shaken), she can justifiably rule out these alternative hypotheses. But since it seems (equally)
likely that the present contains either a puzzle or a game, she cannot justifiably rule out
either of these alternative hypotheses, and so she cannot justifiably believe that the present
contains a puzzle.
This strategy will not work with the cases I have been considering. Here are two
hypotheses:
1. This gym bag is mine
and
2. That gym bag is mine.
Each of these hypotheses, given the circumstances of the case as I have described them, is
equally likely to be true. While Hannah seems to be justified in believing, “There is no bike
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in this box because this box is too small,” there is no similarly justifiable way for me to finish
this sentence: “This gym bag is mine because . . .” Here are two more hypotheses:
3. The actual world contains moral properties but W* does not
and
4. Neither the actual world nor W* contains moral properties (i.e., they are identical).
Again, each of these hypotheses, given the circumstances of the case as I have described
them, is equally likely to be true.

And so the distinction between likely and unlikely

alternative hypotheses seems unhelpful as a strategy for defending the justification of moral
beliefs given weak moral supervenience.
Alternative hypotheses arguments in epistemology are also dealt with by appealing to
the non-necessity of certainty for knowledge. “Sure,” one might respond, “it’s possible that all
of my beliefs about the external world are the byproducts of some evil demon’s deceptive
schemes, and so I cannot be certain that any of those beliefs are true, but why suppose that I
need such certainty in order to have genuine knowledge of the external world?” I happen to
find responses like this rather compelling, and so I’ve never thought too much of alternative
hypotheses arguments in epistemology. But can’t something similar be said in response to
the problem that I’ve been raising for justifying moral beliefs given weak supervenience?
Can’t the ethical naturalist just say something like, “Sure, we might not be able to rule out
the hypothesis that W* and the actual world are identical (in that neither contain moral
properties), and so we cannot be certain that moral propositions are ever true in the actual
world, but that sort of certainty is not necessary for moral knowledge”?
The answer to this question is yes, the naturalist is free to suggest that moral
certainty is unnecessary, and so we might still be justified in believing the actual world to
contain moral properties even if we are unable to rule out hypothesis (4) above; but more
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will be needed. After all, there is still this question: How might we be justified in believing
the actual world to contain moral properties, or in holding any moral belief in particular,
despite our inability to rule out hypothesis (4)? As I see it, there are two answers that might
be given here; but, I will argue, neither of them is available to the ethical naturalist.
The first answer, given by Russ Shafer-Landau, is simply to admit the possibility of
self-evident moral beliefs. He explains,
Beliefs are self-evident if they have as their content self-evident propositions. A proposition
p is self-evident = df. p is such that adequately understanding and attentively considering just
p is sufficient to justify believing that p.74

If p is self-evident, then one’s justification for believing that p is not conditioned upon one’s
ability to eliminate alternative hypotheses, and so the admission of self-evidence amounts to
the denial of the central premise of alternative hypotheses arguments—that one is justified
only to the extent that he or she is able to eliminate alternative hypotheses. As candidate
self-evident moral beliefs, Shafer-Landau suggests the following: Other things being equal,
(a) it is wrong to take pleasure in another’s pain, (b) it is wrong to taunt and threaten the
vulnerable, (c) it is wrong to prosecute and punish those known to be innocent, and (d) it is
wrong to sell another’s secrets solely for personal gain. And surely, these do strike many as
obviously true. But Shafer-Landau is only free to make such appeals to self-evidence because
he’s a non-naturalist. As defined in my introduction, a thoroughgoing naturalism is committed
not just to metaphysical naturalism (which, I gather, Shafer-Landau affirms75) but also
epistemological naturalism (which, with his appeals to self-evidence and his denial that moral
knowledge is always an empirical matter, Shafer-Landau denies). And so, whether successful
or not, self-evidence is not an answer that is available to ethical naturalists.
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3.3 Moral reliabilism
The second way to explain how we might be justified in our moral beliefs despite our
inability to rule out hypothesis (4), and one that is not so clearly unavailable to ethical
naturalists, will involve an appeal to some externalist account of moral justification. After all,
the problem is essentially that none of the resources available internally to us are enough to
distinguish the actual world from W*, and so the justification of our moral beliefs will have
to be an external matter. Consider two types of justification:
The first asks of a given believer whether she is justified in holding a belief. Call this agent
justification. The second asks of a given believer whether she is able to show that her belief is
plausible. Call this demonstrative justification.76

People often fail to distinguish between these two sorts of justification, and so it is often
assumed that a person is only ever justified if she is demonstratively justified. But after
considering three ways of conceiving the standards for demonstrative justification and
finding all of them problematic, Shafer-Landau suggests that this assumption is just wrong.
According to the first of these conceptions, one justifies one’s belief if and only if
one is able to produce the reasons that support it. But surely believing certain mathematical
or analytic truths can be justified even if the believer is unable to provide any supporting
reasons. Moreover, it is not clear to me that simply providing the reasons that support a
particular belief is sufficient for justifying that belief. Consider again the case of the identical
gym bags. Even after providing all of the reasons that support my belief that “This bag is
mine”—e.g., it’s got all of the features that I remember my bag having—it is still not
obvious to me that my belief is justified in the presence of an equally likely, sufficient
counter-weighing set of defeaters.
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According to the second conception of demonstrative justification, a person is
justified only if he is able to “adequately defend its status as justified.”77 This conception is
more obviously problematic. Not only is it unclear what “adequately” will ever mean, but
also, surely there are some who do not have the ability to adequately defend their own beliefs
(e.g., children) and are yet still justified in holding at least some of those beliefs.
And finally, on the third conception of demonstrative justification, a person is
justified in holding some belief only if he is able to persuade another of its truth, or of its
justification. This, again, is far too high a standard for justification. If I am the only person
to witness a particular event, surely my memorial beliefs about the event are justified
whether or not I am able to convince others that it all happened as I remember it. I am
justified in my belief that the earth orbits the sun even if I am unable to convince Gerardus
Bouw78 that I am right, or even that I am justified.
So how else might a person be agent-justified if they are not demonstratively
justified? Shafer-Landau’s answer is to allow justification to be a matter of things external to
the believing person.79 For instance, if, according to a fairly basic conception of reliabilism,
the justification of a belief B is a matter of its being the result of a reliable belief-forming
process, then as long as B was reliably formed, the person holding B could still be justified
even if she is unable to demonstrate why. And so perhaps the problem I’ve raised for moral
knowledge on weak supervenience can be avoided by considering this distinction. Even if
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we are not able to demonstratively justify our moral beliefs by appropriately distinguishing
the actual world from W*, those beliefs may still be justified if they are the result of a reliable
moral belief-forming process. In this sense, some naturalistic version of moral reliabilism
might be effective as an answer to the problem I’ve been raising for moral justification given
weak supervenience.
The problem for the ethical naturalist will be to explain how we get from the
suggestion that our moral beliefs might have been reliably formed to an explanation of how
they are reliably formed. After defending the plausibility of moral reliabilism, Shafer-Landau
concedes, “Even if most of what I have said thus far is on the mark, we are still far short of
knowing how to acquire moral knowledge.”80 Until the ethical naturalist either (a) defines
which process of moral belief formation is reliable, or perhaps (b) offers a clear set of criteria
for evaluating the reliability of such processes, all he really has is the possibility of moral
knowledge, not moral knowledge. And I think that both (a) and (b) will turn out to be
especially difficult. Shafer-Landau’s account of moral reliabilism strikes me as successful
only to the extent that it relies first upon self-evident moral principles.

And as I’ve

explained, this is not an option available to any thoroughgoing naturalist. Furthermore,
whatever account is given will not only have to deal with the problems I’ve raised for
justification given weak supervenience, but also with the problems raised earlier by Street.
There is good reason for the ethical naturalist to believe that evolutionary pressures have
played a significant role in the formation of our moral beliefs. But if we’ve got good reason
to believe that these evolutionary pressures were never truth-aimed to begin with, then we’ve
got good reason to believe that our processes of moral belief formation have been largely
unreliable.
80
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3.4 Conclusion
I think this all leaves the ethical naturalist in a very uncomfortable position. On the
one hand, as I argued in Chapter 1, strong moral supervenience pushes the thoroughgoing
ethical naturalist in one of two directions: (a) he must either build unique facts and
properties about divergent social structures (or varying moral belief systems) into his
subvenient sets, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or (b) he must insist, in the
face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they
are all mistaken—this despite the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for his
moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. And on
the other hand, as I’ve argued in this chapter, weak moral supervenience is a defeater for
moral knowledge—that is, until the ethical naturalist offers a fully satisfying externalist
account of moral justification.
My aim in this thesis has been to put the ethical naturalist “on the ropes,” as it were,
by setting forth a prima facie case for the inadequacy of ethical naturalism. In this regard, I
see my project as dovetailing rather nicely with the recent revival of non-naturalism in ethics.
Whether or not there is a way for naturalists to respond to my worries about moral
supervenience while still maintaining both (a) a thoroughgoing naturalism and (b) all of the
essentials of moral realism, I will leave it to them to determine. My initial suspicion,
however, is that much of the problem just is their thoroughgoing naturalism, and so some
variety of either (a) ethical non-naturalism, or (b) anti-realism about moral properties81 may
actually be their only options.

81

Indeed, Street’s conclusion in her paper is that Darwinian considerations and their implications for
ethical naturalists offer us excellent reason to be anti-realists.
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